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• Commerce Amendment Bill reported back from Select Committee on 28 July 
2008
• Five topics
– Purpose statement
– Default price-quality paths (design/transition)
– Exemptions
– Customised proposals
– Appeals
• Particular Issues
Outline
Purpose Statement
Context of the Part 4 review
• No purpose statement for Part 4
• But Part 4A purpose statement since 2001
• Section 57E
Efficiency/Wealth Transfer Issue
• The search for a workable solution to accommodate both 
goals is problematic
• Ultimately a judgment call is required as to which goal or 
what balance in goals prevails
• Short to medium term allocative impacts of wealth transfer 
will overwhelm medium to long term dynamic efficiency 
(investment) considerations
• International practice is heading away from “shopping lists” 
(eg s 7 Australian National Electricity Law)
Section 52A
…to promote the long-term benefit of consumers  … by promoting 
outcomes that are consistent with the outcomes produced in 
competitive markets such that suppliers of regulated  … services:
(a) Have incentives to innovate and invest
(b) Have incentives to improve efficiency
(c) Share benefits of efficiency gains with consumers (including through 
lower prices)
(d) Are limited in their ability to extract excessive profits
How Will Section 52A Apply?
• Just a repeat of s 57E?
• Commission may assert it has already taken (a) and 
(b) into account in the application of s 57E
• Prediction  -- s 52A will be applied essentially in the 
same manner as s 57E
• Surprising that most submitters supported s 52A
Default Price-Quality Paths
– No 2009 reset
– First default price-quality path (1 April 2009 to 31 
March 2010) (ss 54J(2) and (3))
– Information disclosure s 52O determination as soon as 
practicable after 1 April 2009 (ss 54I(1) and 53C)
– Second default price-quality path to be published by 1 
December for the period 1 April 2010 to 31 March 
2015 (or 2014) (ss 54JA(1), 53M(5) and (3))
Content of Default Price-Quality Paths
• Three matters (ss 53P and 52O)
– Starting prices
– Rates of change
– Quality standards
• Components
– Likely to be based on input methodologies, but this is not a 
requirement (ss 52S and 52O(2))
• Timing problem
– Input methodologies not set until June 2010 (or possibly later) (s 
52T(1))
– Potential for default price-quality path adjustment if post- 1 April 2010 
input methodologies would result in a materially different path (s 
54JA(3) and (4))
What Will Input Methodologies Look Like?
• Must be in sufficient detail to enable ELBs to reasonably 
assess their regulatory position (s 52S(1A)) (eg WACC 
number rather than a range)
• But what will input methodologies actually look like?
– Factual basis
– Level of prescription
• How likely is it that there will be a dispute between the 
regulator and those regulated as to the sufficiency of the 
detail?
Individual Assessments of Rate Changes
• Start point for the default price-quality path is that one 
common rate change applies to each type of service (s 
53P(3))
• Section 53P(6)  -- alternate rate changes for individual 
suppliers can be imposed:
– if this is necessary or desirable to minimise undue financial 
hardship to the supplier or to minimise price shocks to 
consumers
– As an incentive for suppliers to improve quality
• Therefore, focus on individual price-quality paths for 
each ELB?
Exemptions
• Scope widened for consumer-owned ELBs 
to be subject only to information disclosure 
requirements
• Potentially only around 12 ELBs may 
remain non-exempt
Customised Proposals
• Notwithstanding the set of default price-quality paths on 1 April 2009 
and 2010, ELBs won’t be able to apply for customised proposals 
until after June 2010 (s 54P(1))
• No ability to withdraw application (s 53R)
• Limited to 4 a year (s 53Y(2))
• Time for consideration  -- 10-15 months (ss 53S-U)
• Increase/decrease via claw-back (ss 53V, 52CA and 53P(2))
Appeals
Standard appeal rights proposed for both input methodologies 
and final customised proposal decisions
But
Section 91(1AA)  -- appeals of final customised proposal 
decisions may not include an appeal against all or any part of an 
input methodology
The Dual Appeal Problem
Input methodologies are likely to be central to final decisions
Input methodologies may only be decided once every 7 years (s 
52X(1))
Appeal rights for input methodologies are limited to a 20 day window 
once every 7 years (s 52Z(1))
The Problem in Timeline Terms
1. Input methodologies to be set June 2010 (and there may be an appeal of 
these, based on the facts applying at 2010)
2. Next reset of default price-quality path in 2015
3. Assume an application for a customised proposal in 2015 and a decision 
on this in 2016, with an appeal in 2016
4. The appeal in 2016 cannot reopen the 2010 input methodology decision
5. Therefore all relevant facts applying to input methodologies from 2010 to 
2016 cannot be taken into account
Particular Issue 1: Certainty
• The purpose is to (52Q) promote certainty regarding rules, rule 
requirements etc and (52S 1A (a))in sufficient detail such that 
each affected supplier is reasonably able to estimate the material 
effects of the methodology on the supplier.
• Certainty would have been enhanced by providing, as Australia 
does (Ch 6, National Electricity Rules), that among input 
methodologies is that the supplier not be regulated in such a way 
that its credit rating slip below some level “BBB+” due to this 
regulation. 
• Certainty will be affected by the definition of methodologies and 
their balance with implementation: regulation is not mechanical
Particular Issue 2: how do input 
methodologies differ from implementation? 
(WACC 1)
1. The regulatory rate of return is determined by a) the 
WACC and  b) adjustments for business and regulatory 
risk (affected by the form of regulation)
2. The WACC is determined by theory and unobserved 
components 
1. That have intrinsic volatility; and
2. That are guessed with estimates that have much 
variation 
Particular Issue 2: how do input 
methodologies differ from implementation? 
(WACC 2)
3. For the WACC and the regulatory return the same theory and data 
yield a wide distribution
4. A choice of number within some range, 
a  –––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– b
5. To impart any certainty the location has to be known and so location 
in the distribution is part of the methodology . 
6. Data to populate the model need not be known but its construction 
and estimation techniques must be so specified.
Particular Issue 2: how do input 
methodologies differ from implementation? 
(WACC 3)
7. Thus, implementation and methodology in essence  the same, in 
which case appeals should apply to methodologies in appeals of final 
determinations
8. A gap between implementation and methodologies opens up scope 
for the Commission in regulation and expands areas of appeal in final 
determinations  
Particular Issue 2: how do input 
methodologies differ from implementation? 
(WACC 4)
9. The WACC may seem the simplest methodology to settle because it 
(seemingly) has a settled formula but it is taking some some 4 years 
to implement the development of a WACC methodology  
10. The best way to test a methodology is to implement it and explore its 
implications: but this won’t generally be possible for lines companies 
as there is 20 days to appeal methodology developed by the end of 
2009 that may not be applied for a long period
Particular Issue 3: transfers or efficiency?
1. As mentioned, the proposals do not more strongly suggest that 
efficiency be the criterion
2. Investigations (52 H (2)b) provides that distributional 
considerations are seemingly given equal weight with efficiency, 
and (52 H (3)) that every effort be made to quantify both. 
3. The Revised Act does call (52S(2)) for the methodologies to not 
unduely inhibit investment (which seemingly envisages some 
inhibition of investment)  
4. Iists “quality” factors that regulation should not inhibit: including 
energy efficiency (54Q). 
Particular Issue 4: exemptions
1. The exemption for small cooperatively owned lines companies is 
reasonable since there is no market power issue here
2. Amalgamations will be limited to an extent by the threshold of 150,000 
ICPs
3. Essentially the same arguments as for cooperative companies applies to 
municipally-owned lines companies: the only difference is that profit may 
be returned via reduced local taxes and dollars for projects: such profit 
may well be a relatively efficient tax
4. Provides that 15%-20% of consumers (of some sort (54H)) may instigate 
a Commission regulation enquiry
1. What form of regulation would it be with no market power problem?
2. The threshold may be low enough for interest group pressures
In Broad Terms
1. The revision arose largely because of implementation problems
2. The proposal is, socially desirably, more selective regulation, and 
appeal rights
3. The revision is detailed and 
1. There are timing issues 
2. The objective is no clearer
3. Certainty of the regulatory rules will depend upon the specification of 
workable methodologies and their relationship to implementation
4. Implementation remains the key to a lively productive lines sector
